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Abstract
The September 11 attack on the US has revealed an unprecedented
terrorism with worldwide range of destruction. It is argued to result
from the first worldwide percolation of passive supporters. They are
people sympathetic to the terrorism cause but without being involved
with it. They just don’t oppose it in case they could. This scheme puts
suppression of the percolation as the major strategic issue in the fight
against terrorism. Acting on the population is shown to be useless.
Instead a new strategic scheme is suggested to increase the terrorism
percolation threshold and in turn suppress the percolation. The rele-
vant associated space is identified as a multi-dimensional social space
including both the ground earth surface and all various independent
flags displayed by the terrorist group. Some hints are given on how
to shrink the geographical spreading of terrorism threat. The model
apply to a large spectrum of clandestine activities including guerilla
warfare as well as tax evasion, corruption, illegal gambling, illegal
prostitution and black markets.
keyword: terrorism, percolation, passive supporters, social space
PACS: 89.75Hc, 05.50+q, 87.23.G
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1 Defining the problem
Terrorism is a daily reality of horror for millions people in the world. Though
it has always existed, its various expressions have been confined within quite
precise areas. However, September 11 has revealed an unprecedented world
wide spreading of a given terrorist group. In response to such a new and
permanent world threat, enormous military, police and information efforts
are put in to try to curb this new terrorism. But in spite of a certain number
of significant but always specific successes, the current terrorist challenge
remains incredibly powerful and present.
It is worth to note, though at a different scale, the same holds true for
more traditional terrorism like Basque, Irish and Corsican ones. After years
of anti-terrrorism fight they are still not eradicated quite to the contrary. It
thus seems that the techniques used to fight terrorism are not adapted to the
task. We suggest here focusing onto the social space in which the terrorists
live, moves and acts. While much effort are devoted to study terrorist net-
works themselves, their structure, their means, their motivation, and their
potential targets [1, 2], very little is known about the human environment in
which terrorists evolve. This space includes the terrorists themselves, their
potential targets and also each one of us.
The following of the paper is organised as follows. Part two introduces
the notion of social permeability to terrorism. The problem of the range
of terrorism threat is then analysed in terms of a percolation phenomenon.
Traditional terrorism corresponds to non percolating situations while inter-
national terrorism is associated to a world-wide percolation. Curbing terror-
ism using only military means is found to be ineffecient in Part three. Part
four suggests a new strategy to reduce current world-wide terrorism threat
without hurting its passive supporters. Some hint on how to shrink the ter-
rorism threat without massive military destruction are singled out. The last
part discuss the universality of the model. In particular it is applicable to
guerilla warfare as well as tax evasion, corruption, illegal gambling, illegal
prostitution and black markets.
2 The social permeability
We study the social permeability to terrorist individual moves. Permeability
is used here to mean a free passage granted to a terrorist. It is assumed
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to result from passive support to the terrorist cause by some subset of the
population. It holds without any involvement with either the terrorist group
or its activities. It is an individual dormant attitude associated to a personal
opinion. It does not need to be explicitly set. We denote these people as
passive supporters. They just do not oppose a terrorist act in case they
could (see Fig. (1)). They go unnoticeable and most of them reject the
violent aspect of the terrorist action. They only share in part their cause.
We are dealing here with a distribution of individual passivities in shar-
ing independently a common sympathy towards the terrorist cause. Passive
supporters do not need to communicate among them. Within a metaphorical
representation, it can be said that each individual is looking only out of its
own window, and not beyond. In this schematic way, each person occupies
and observes some portion of a territory from its personal window. Each
one can then decide to close or open its window curtains independently from
each other at the time a suspect observation could be done.
Accordingly, to move freely and safely a terrorist must find a series of
contiguous windows of closed curtains. To be reachable from the terrorist
base a potential target must be connected by at least one continuous path
of closed curtain windows. Since indeed each window state is independent
of the terrorist will, it is in fact all of the existing possible paths starting
from the terrorist base, which determine the social space open to terrorist
action. We call it the Active Open Space (AOS). Several Open Spaces (OS)
are expected to exist simultaneously but are not accessible to terrorist action,
not being connected to the terrorist base. An illustration is given in Fig. (2)
It is worth to note the huge majority of passive supporters will never be
faced with a terrorist crossing by. These individual sympathies are dormant
and almost never activated. It makes them invisible and non-identifiable
within an anti-terrorist fight. They are completely scattered and randomly
distributed on a given territory. Nevertheless it is their geometrical aggrega-
tion by simple adjacent juxtaposition, which creates a series of labyrinths of
permeable paths to terrorist moves. Not withstanding their invisibility they
determine the whole spectrum of targets potentially accessible to a terrorist
action. In return any attempt to circumvent the terrorist threat cannot be
successfully achieved without an evaluation of the current degree of social
permeability. It is indeed both a strategic and a conceptual challenge. And
here is where Physics can proves useful.
At this stage, applying percolation theory to terrorism social permeability
appears quite natural in order to build a coherent and unified framework
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Figure 1: On top a box in passive position, ”closed curtains”, a terrorist can
cross the box from any of its four sides. On bottom, a box in active position,
”opened curtains”, a terrorist cannot cross safely. From any side the box is
under scrutiny.
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Figure 2: A portion of 12x12 box grid. Passive supporters occupy dark
boxes, their curtains are closed. The boxes are free to terrorist crossing. On
the other hand, white boxes have open curtains, they are closed to terrorist
movement. The nearest neighbor juxtaposition of dark boxes produces Open
Spaces (OS) to terrorist action. But only the one including the terrorist
base (TB) is active (AOS) with an effective terrorist threat. Other OS are
inaccessible to terrorist action.
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to the geographical deployment of terrorist action [3]. An illustration is
exhibited in Fig. (3) Such a ”Global Physics” approach [4] is part of a new
growing trend of research [5]. In the last years a growing number of physicists
have been studying social and political behaviors using concepts and tools
from Statistical Physics [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Among others, a rumor formation
model has been used recently to explain the French Pentagon Hoax case [12].
Percolation theory [13] has been also used to describe connectivity problems
[14, 15]. Here it allows to connect the range of a given terrorism threat
to the surrounding population attitude towards that specific terrorism. [3].
However it is worth stressing we are are not investigating either the terrorist
net itself or its internal mechanisms.
Moreover our work does not aim at an exact description of terrorism
complexity. Making some crude approximations allow exhibiting an essen-
tial characteristics of terrorism by linking its capacity of destruction to the
surrounding population attitude. In particular a target is set to be reachable
once it is located within an area covered by a cluster of people who are pas-
sively consenting to the terrorist cause. The September 11 terrorist attack on
the US is given an explanation in terms of the first worldwide percolation of
such a cluster of passively consenting people [3]. On this basis some clues are
obtained on how to curb terrorism threat without using large range military
destruction [16].
3 The no solution scenario
At this stage, we can conclude that for a given territory the distribution and
the size of passive supporter aggregated spaces yield the range of terrorist
action. It is the relative value of the passive support p of the population
compared to the value of the critical threshold pc of the corresponding space,
which determines the effective amplitude of the terrorist threat. If the passive
support density is less than the percolation threshold (p < pc), most of the
territory is safe with only one rstricted area under terrorist threat as shown in
Fig. (3). At contrast as soon as the passive support density gets larger than
the percolation threshold (p > pc), all the territory falls under the terrorist
threat (see Fig. (4)).
However, while in a physical system the size is infinite, here the delim-
itation of the size of the territory considered is an essential data. One can
have a density of passive supporters p which satisfies the condition p > pc
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OS
AOS
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Figure 3: A whole country sparse with little and disjoined OS of more or
less wide. They are indicated in dark. The couintry is not under total terror
threat.
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Some still disconnected OS
Initial large AOS is
percolating
TB
Figure 4: Few additional passive supporters have appeared with respect to
Fig (3). They are sufficient to create a percolation phenomenon. The whole
country is now under total terror threat (shown in dark). Some sparse OS
are still disjoined from the percolating cluster.
8
over a given geographical surface, and at the same time for a larger territory
including the first one another density p satisfying p′ < pc. Indeed, always
the number of passive supporters strongly decreases far from the home area
of terrorism. That is the case of traditional terrorism already mentioned
previously. For example in the Corsican case, terrorism does percolate at the
level of the associated island but not at the level of France and even less at
the world level.
Terrorist deployment thus obeys a universal scheme of activity with two
phases, a percolating one and a non-percolating one. The only difference
from one terrorism to another is the scale on which passive supporters are
spread and the geographical area on which a percolation may take place.
Obviously if the change of scale does not change the nature of the terrorist
phenomenon, it modifies in a substantial manner the number of threatened
people. It is clearly not a negligible difference. It is the case of September 11,
which while revealing for the first time the existence of a world percolation
showed that simultaneously from now on the whole world population is in
danger.
In this context, for a territory under active terrorist threat, the lifting
of the threat requires the suppression of the passive supporter percolation.
If any destruction of a terrorist cell has obvious immediate advantages, it
is without effect on the range and acuity of the threat. As soon as a new
terrorist group is formed, it can strike again and immediately in all the space
which remains accessible to its members. The strategic challenge is thus to
bring back the condition p > pc to some new condition p < pc by lowering
the density of passive supporters from p to p. Such a reduction induces a
sudden shrinking of the whole territory accessible to terrorist action. Such
a condition would reduce the AOS to a narrow geographical area. However
a solid implementation of such a programm on the military level is simply
terrifying.
Therefore an efficient military solution is completely unacceptable for eth-
ical reason as well as from the point of view of moral and justice. It feasibility
would lead destroying a good part of the planet, although existing weapons
of massive destruction would allow it. At the same time, any partial military
solution appear to be useless since without effect on the level of the terrorist
threat. At this stage the conclusion from our study seems to show no hope in
curbing terrorism. Accordingly, international terrorism would be a fatality
against which nothing can be done. The anti-terrorist fight being limited to
specific actions against the networks themselves. The current danger would
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thus remain unchanged with a world social permeability activated on request
from a terrorist group.
4 The social space of terrorism
From above no solution conclusion, reversing the usual physical scheme to
suppress a percolation can proves usefull in providing an alternative to the
problem. Instead of changing the density of sites, a solution may exist on
modifying the value of the percolation threshold itself without touching on
the sites themselves.
Percolation thresholds depends primarily on two independent parameters,
the connectivity of the network q and the dimension of the space d. For
instance, for a square lattice with q = 4 and d = 2, pc = 0.59. On the other
hand the cubic extension has d = 3, q = 6 and pc = 0.31. The hypercube at
four dimensions has q = 8 and pc = 0.20. Increasing the dimension or and
the connectivity creates more possible ways to connect from one site away.
It leads to a reduction in the value of the percolation threshold. However
very few geometrical networks allow an exact calculation of their percolation
threshold, most of them being calculated numerically.
For a social application of percolation, connectivity may be of the order
of 16 for a dimension of a priori 2, the surface of the earth. It would corre-
spond to an unknown network in Physics. Thus its percolation threshold is
unknown. But fortunately it turns out that few years ago a universal formula
for all percolation thresholds was discovered [17].
pc = a[(d− 1)(q − 1)]
−b , (1)
where d is dimension, q connectivity, a = 1.2868 and b = 0.6160. The Galam-
Mauger formula [17] yields with the percent close all known thresholds. In
addition it can predict the value of the threshold for any network defined by
the values of both its connectivity and dimension. The formula is shown in
three dimensions in Figure (5).
Having the formula, assuming q = 16 the challenge is to estimate the
dimension of the terrorism social space. Here we make the hypothesis that in
a social movement additional dimensions are produced by social paradigms
in which individuals may position themselves in a similar way they do on
earth. Thus it is necessary to consider the ”flags” by which terrorists ground
10
Figure 5: Representation of the Galam-Mauger universal formula [17] for all
the thresholds of percolation as function of connectivity and dimension. The
formula writes pc = a[(d− 1)(q − 1)]
−b where d is dimension, q connectivity,
a = 1.2868 and b = 0.6160.
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their fight in addition to the earth surface two dimensions [16]. To each one
of these flags, people may identify with more or less support.
Typically for most terrorist groups, the first flag is a territorial claim
either independence or autonomy. This flag constitute the first social dimen-
sion independent of those from the geography. Also, as soon as a terrorist
group enters in action, it induces some state repression against it, which in
turn determines a new additional flag. People may disapprove the repres-
sion hardness. That gives already 4 dimensions. Thus, any terrorist social
dimension seems to be at least of a value four.
For q = 16 and d = 4 the Galam-Mauger formula [17] yields a percolation
threshold at pc = 0.12 to be compared with the value pc = 0.65 for a square
system with q = 4 and d = 2. It means that as soon as a terrorist causes
is supported by more than 12% of a population, the corresponding terrorist
group can move with complete freedom on all the associated territory. This
value is not very high making it certainly reached in traditional terrorism
in Corsica, North Ireland and Basque area (see Fig. (6). It may explain
the continuous on going incapacity of the respective authorities to cut short
these terrorist groups.
In above cases, within the framework of our model, not much seem to
be possible since a dimension of 4 is irreducible. It is the dimensional lower
limit of any terrorist activity. Traditional terrorism of low dimension could
thus keep alive, except finding how to yield a drop in the density of passive
supporters down to less than 12%. It is interesting, and perhaps useful to
note that, within the present framework the absence of repression would bring
down the dimension at d = 3 making the threshold up to 16%. Such numbers
would suggest that for instance, in case the popular Corsican support for
independence ranges between 12% and 16%, it is indeed the repression which
allows it to percolate all over the Corsican territory.
With regard to the new international terrorism the situation seems qual-
itatively and quantitatively different. Indeed it is difficult to believe it has
a support of more than 10% of the world population. At the same time it
appears to be clearly successful in having its passive supporters to percolate
worldly. Using the Galam-Mauger formula [17], to carry out a percolation
with only a few percent of people and a connectivity of 16 requires a space
of higher dimension larger than the 4 value of traditional terrorism as shown
in Fig. (7).
And indeed, what characterizes current international terrorism is the
broad spectrum of flags on which it deploys its claims [16]. In addition
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No terrorism out
OS
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Figure 6: Diagram for Corsica with an Active Open Space, which percolates
at the level of the island but with no possible extension beyond. Black squares
are passive supporters while while ones are not.
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Figure 7: Representation of the universal formula Galam-Mauger [17] for
fixed connectivity as function of dimension. It is seen that the threshold
values drop with dimension
14
to traditional territorial claims, it has at least a religious dimension, an eth-
nic dimension, a bipolarizing dimension of partitioning the world, a social
dimension, a regional dimension and a historical dimension. That brings its
social dimension to 10. Such a value results in a lowering of the percolation
threshold down to only 6%, which becomes a more realistic estimate for its
world support.
5 Hints for global terror curb
Current world terrorism by creating a large number of independent flags has
drastically increased its potential range of world destruction. That process
has enabled a world percolation of only few percent of passive supporters all
over the world. But simultaneously, it provides hints to envision some solu-
tion in curbing current world threat. In particular, contrary to low dimension
terrorism for which a dimension reduction is impossible, here action becomes
possible to reduce the number of dimensions deployed by international ter-
rorism [16]. More specifically, political, economic and psychological actions
should be capable to neutralize a certain number of these flags without use
of military means.
For example to lower the social dimension from d = 10 to d = 6 make the
threshold to soar from 6% to 10%. Such an increase would suppress at once
the world percolation. Accordingly terrorism would immediately reduce to
only one area of the world as for other terrorism. Of course the solid measures
on how to put in action the flag neutralization process is out the scope of
physicists. It requires an interdisciplinary collaboration with specialists in
the other concerned disciplines.
At this stage the possibility of an efficient non-destructive large scale
fight against international terrorism passes trough a deep interdisciplinary
research. What may turn a challenge may be more difficult than the fight
against terrorism. Last but not least it is worth to restate the current analysis
does not claim at an exact quantitative description of terrorism reality. It
only aims in shedding a new light on linking passive individual support to
a terrorism cause and the associated range of action of the corresponding
terrorist group.
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6 From terrorism to guerilla warfare and un-
deground activities
Our model to terror threat is indeed much more universal than the field
of terrorism. First we have to define more precisely what terrorism is. In
particular what is denoted terrorism by legal and institutional organizations
is called freedom fights by others underground groups. Most of the time,
terrorism is what the others do. Nevertheless some consensus seems to exist
along for instance the so called “Mitchell report”, which was accepted by
both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government, defining terror
as attack on random, unarmed people.
While our model definitively apply for above definitio, it also applies
equally well to the murder of a specific target by a clandestine group, like
the killing of Israel’s tourism minister Ze’evi, which is not terrorism in the
Mitchell sense. Accrodingly guerilla warfare may be a more appropriate word
for violent activities modeled by the model.
Moreover, the same mathematics also applies to lots of other clandestine
activities like tax evasion, corruption, illegal gambling, illegal prostitution,
black markets, etc. Without undocumented immigrants, the economy of
California might break down. On this basis we can conclude that we have
presented indeed a universal model to clandestine cooperation. It would be
now very fruitfull to confront our general frame to real cases with data and
facts But clearly such a taskis beyong the physicist skill.
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